DECLASSIFIED

E.G. 11657, Sec. 3(D and 510) \(\text{in} \)

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THE DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH

U : The Secretary

APR 1 6 1963

THEOGRAPH J/S P.O. T. III. - Thomas L. Heghes W

The US Aif &ttaché in Noscou relates a report that Norshals Usckalenko and Colikov had opposed the Guban Auscile tecisions in early 1962. As a result they suffered denotions in April and returned to Saver in November.

The "experienced Noscou observer" who was the source of the report Surther stated that Khrushchev made the Guban missile decision and that it was definitely not imposed upon him by hard-line military men or a Presiding Saction.

Ential Infilmation. This is the circumstated report we have seen on the subject. We can confirm that the two Marshals mentioned was chifted from their positions last spring. Mockalenko was removed as chief of the Strategic Mocket Forces and became Chief Inspector of the Soviet Armed Forces. Golikov in May was removed as the chief political officer of the armed services because of ill health. However, their return to favor cannot be documented. Tolikov, according to a Soviet protocol officer who reviewed the guest list for the US Armed Forces day reception, remains in poor health and would not be able to accept an invitation. Moskalenko was recently rumored to be due for a promotion, but we have not had any further news on that score.

G.:DUP 3

Downgraded at 12 year intervals; not automatically declassified.

Thesis Plausible. We believe the thesis of the report to be generally plausible. Moviet military men, and the chief of the Otrategic Mocket Forces in particular, may well have had reason to oppose the Cuban deployment on military grounds, while Khrushchev might have teen the venture as a cheep means of adding to Soviet ability to threaten the US.